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Euler’s theorem under the microscope:
A tribute to Imre Lakatos

“Proofs and refutations: the logic of mathematical discovery” by Imre Lakatos was published posthumously in 1976.  This is a fascinating, if somewhat hard to access, book which calls into question many of the assumptions that we make about proof – one may start reading with a clear sense of what mathematical proof is, but almost certainly will have had one’s mind changed by the end!

The first part of the book is written out as the script of a play, the characters being the teacher and a series of pupils given the names of Greek letters.  Extensive footnotes give considerable additional information as to where the arguments come from.  At the opening of the book the pupils have, by considering a range of polyhedra, arrived at the conjecture that, using normal notation, V – E + F = 2.  The teacher then gives a standard proof of this, attributed to Cauchy.  The proof involves a thought-experiment whereby one of the faces is removed and the remainder of the shape is stretched flat onto a plane – so if the conjecture is correct, there is one fewer face and the number of vertices and edges stay the same, so V – E + F =1.  Extra edges are added in order that every face is a triangle – since adding each edge adds a face with the number of vertices left the same, the value for V – E + F remains the same.  Triangles are on the boundary are removed one at a time – in each case V – E + F is left unaffected.  When only one triangle is left, there are 3 vertices, 1 face and 3 edges, so V – E + F = 1 as required.

So far so (relatively) straightforward.  But this is where the fun starts.  Firstly the steps in the proof are pulled apart – how can we be sure that V – E + F remains unaffected when a triangle is removed?  And in any case, depending on the order in which the removal is done, the remainder may be in more than one piece so V – E + F no longer equals 1.

And then various counter-examples are given, including cubes with an inner cube removed, a large cube with a smaller cube on top, a single shape consisting of two tetrahedra joined at an edge, and another with two tetrahedral joined just at a single point.  
A less complex counter-example is a nice straightforward cylinder, which has two edges, three faces and no vertices – doesn’t it?  And yet another counter-example is the small stellated dodecahedron, which can be represented in a two-dimensional form as follows:

Counting the intersecting ‘star pentagons’ as one face each, this has 12 faces, 30 edges and 12 vertices, so V – E + F = -6.

Different methods of dealing with these counter-examples are then given.  One is to refine the original conjecture as to what the theorem is referring to.  It is also possible to refine definitions, for example of a polyhedron to insist that ‘it is possible to get from the inside of any polygon (or face) to the inside of any other polygon by a route which never crosses any edge at a vertex” which excludes the two tetrahedra joined at a single vertex.  The small stellated dodecahedron can be excluded by insisting that the full face must be visible externally, therefore the faces are not star pentagons but isosceles triangles.  This now gives 60 faces, 90 edges and 32 vertices, so V – E + F = 2.  It is worth noting that this shape is not convex – so whilst insisting on convexity greatly reduces the number of potential counter examples to the conjecture, it also excludes polyhedra for which the formula does hold.  As an attempt to address this issue, the concept of ‘quasi-convexity’ is introduced – but this would appear to create at least as many problems as it solves.

Some of the ‘repairs’ went back to the original Cauchy proof, which depends on the idea that having removed a face the remainder of the shape can be stretched flat onto a plane.  By insisting that this is possible, the sphere, and also the cube with an internal cube removed, are excluded.  But the logic is now dangerously close to being circular – and also in danger of getting overly complicated.  A cylinder still meets this condition if one of the circular faces is removed but not the ‘jacket’ – so do we need yet another refinement?  Similarly, edges cannot be added to a cylinder whilst keeping the number of faces and vertices the same in order to triangulate the shape – so does that give us another get out?

Full circularity is achieved when it is suggested that a polyhedron be defined as a three-dimensional shape which obeys V – E + F = 2.  And another approach is to say, let’s drop the assumption that V – E + F =2, and instead group polyhedra according to their ‘Euler characteristic’.  So, having found one polyhedron for which (arguably) V – E + F = -6, is it possible to find further such polyhedra and to look for other points of commonality?





is discontinuous, alternating between π/4 and -π/4 – an effect which can be seen using graph plotting software.

More than anything else this discussion points towards the need for a huge amount of caution in approaching the whole notion of proof, with two clear examples of principles which would appear to be sound which under close examination prove not to be.  In both cases the discussions described occurred over very large time periods which raises the question – what is it that we currently hold to be ‘proved’ which will be called into question at some point in the indefinite future?

Mathematical proof can often be presented as a cut and dried process dependent on memorization for the obtaining of the ‘correct’ answer.  So a 1910 school examination question set for the University of Cambridge reads, “Prove that if a straight line cuts two parallel straight lines, the alternate angles are equal" (Board of Education 1912).  It would appear that the only possible way of answering that question correctly as far as the examiners are concerned is by memorisation of the ‘correct’ answer, knowing what it is that we are allowed to assume and what it is that remains to be proved.  This is, of course, a very old example, but is it so different to the experience of many school and University students now?

But apart from reducing what can be an exciting, challenging, living activity to a ‘spectator sport’, this approach denies what has been demonstrated very clearly – what appear to be water tight arguments can, and have, been found wanting at some later stage.  An analogy can be drawn with a computer program - how can you ever be sure that it is completely ‘bug free’?  For however long it runs, there is always the possibility that a different set of variables will cause a problem.

One possible solution here is to think not in terms of proof but in terms of reasoning, looking to produce arguments which persuade ourselves, persuade friends and then persuade enemies, encouraging conjecture, debate, the generation of counter-examples and ways of dealing with these – do we refine our conjecture in order to exclude the counter-example, and when do we decide that the conjecture has become too complicated to be interesting or useful?  Would it be possible to have a conjecture’ board and a ‘proof’ board in a classroom, aimed at creating a climate in which youngsters are actively encouraged to be creative, take risks, put forward ideas which may or may not be right, to probe, question and engage.








With many thanks to Anne Watson for convening the seminar held in Oxford in October 2009 from which this piece arises, and for her comments on earlier drafts.
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